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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHESTER E. FARROW, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
No. 15458 
HEALTH SERVICES CORP., 
SALT LAKE CLINIC, LOUIS J. 
SCHRICKER, M.D., and LOUIS 
G. MOENCH, M.D. I 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS SALT LAKE CLINIC 
AND LOUIS G, MOENCH 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for malpractice brought by Appellant 
Chester E. Farrow against the Health Services Corporation, the 
Salt Lake Clinic, Louis J. Schricker, M.D., and Louis G. Moench, 
M.D. 
Plaintiff-Appellant alleges that the defendants were ne-
gligent in their care and treatment of him during his 1974 con-
finement in the L.D.S. Hospital. 
DISPOSITION I~~ LOWER COURT 
Shortly before trial the court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Dr. Schricker and the Health Services Corporation. 
A jury trial was held as to the remaining defendants, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Moench and the Salt Lake Clinic. The jury found in favor of 
Moench and the Salt Lake Clinic by returning a verdict of no 
cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents Salt Lake Clinic and Louis G. Moench seek af-
firmance of the jury verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents Salt Lake Clinic (hereinafter referred to as 
Clinic) and Dr. Louis G. Moench (hereinafter referred to as Dr. 
Moench) disagree with the Statement of Facts in Appellant's 
Brief because it omits evidence detrimental to Plaintiff. Res-
pondents submit the following Statement of Facts as a more ace~ 
rate account of the evidence adduced at trial. It should also 
be noted that Respondents Clinic and Dr. Moench are not invo~~ 
in the questions or evidence presented at the motions for summar 
judgment and therefore any pre-trial testimony which was not 
used during the trial itself will not be relied upon in this 
Statement. 
Background Prior to Hospitalization 
The plaintiff Chester E. Farrow testified that at the time. 
of trial he was 52 years of age and had worked as a geological 
consultant. (Tr., p. 1344). He obtained a bachelor's degree 
from Oklahoma State University in 1949 and thereafter worked fM 
the United States Geological Survey. He worked for the Atomic 
-2-
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Energy Commission, as a consultant for various private compan-
ies, as an in-house geologist for one such company, and was an 
independent consultant at the time of the incident. (Tr., p. 
1345). 
Plaintiff related that in August of 1974, while helping 
his wife move groceries from his Chevrolet Blazer, he hit his 
arm against the mirror bracket. This impact immediately caused 
a series of spasms and great pain to his arm and neck region. 
(Tr., p. 1349). Shortly thereafter he went to the Moab Hospi-
tal and consulted with a Dr. Peters. He was given some medica-
tion to ease the pain. (Tr., p. 1350). 
The following Monday he contacted his family doctor who 
gave him more medication. The next day he went to the Moab 
Hospital and had x-rays taken. (Tr., p. 1351). At that time 
it was suggested that he go to Salt Lake City for further treat-
ment. (Tr., p. 1352). 
Upon cross-examination the plaintiff admitted that he had 
experienced marital difficulties over a long period of time and 
in fact his wife had divorced him in 1966 but subsequently re-
married him. (Tr., p. 1422). His wife felt there were more 
serious problems with the marriage than did the plaintiff. 
p. 1426). 
Hospitalization and Surgery 
(Tr., 
Plaintiff stated that he arrived in Salt Lake City on Au-
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
gust 11 and checked into the L.D.S. Hospital the following 
day. (Tr., p. 1352). He stated that he was examined by Dr. 
Schricker who took his medical history and told him there was 
a good chance he would have to undergo an operation. He had 
previously been told of this possibility by his Moab doctor. 
(Tr., p. 1352). 
Dr. Schricker testified that he performed a physical ex-
amination and neurological examination of the plaintiff at the 
time of his admission and recommended x-rays of the neck and a 
myelogram. (Tr., p. 1887). These tests subsequently revealed 
that the plaintiff had a ruptured cervical disk at the C-6 
level. He discussed the findings with Plaintiff and his wife 
and it was mutually agreed that Plaintiff undergo corrective 
surgery. (Tr., p. 1887). 
Prior to surgery Plaintiff stated that he informed both 
Dr. Schricker and the anesthesiologist that he had had a bad 
reaction to sodium pentothal in a 1949 appendectomy operation 
and that he became very violent under the drug's influence. 
(Tr., pp. 1354-1355). 
On August 15 Dr. Schricker performed a cervical laminectomy 
and a foramentomy. These operations removed part of the bone of 
the spinal column and the root of a small tunnel called the fo~· 
men in order to allow the nerve more room and to do away with 
compression. (Tr., p. 1888). Dr. Schricker testified thataf-
-4-
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ter this type of operation the area is unprotected and there 
is considerable danger of injury to the spinal column unless 
activity and stress are avoided. (Tr . , p. 1B9 3) • 
August 16 Through August 22 
Dr. Schricker recalled that on the 16th of August the 
plaintiff told him that he was free of pain in his arm and 
neck area except for the expected discomfort from the incision 
itself. (Tr., p. 1893). During this period Dr. Schricker 
testified that the plaintiff suffered mild confusion from the 
medication which he had received--especially the morphine. The 
confusion fluctuated a great deal so that sometimes he appeared 
quite clear and other times he appeared quite confused. (Tr., 
p. 1894). 
Karen Pool testified that she was a registered nurse who 
was assigned as the "charge" nurse for the sixth floor, west 
ward. (Tr., p. 1668). She was on duty approximately nine of 
the 10 days that the plaintiff was in the ward, (Tr., p. 1684) 
although she worked at different hours on different days. (Tr., 
p. 1686). 
She stated that for several days after the operation he 
progressed very well but continually tried to get up and walk 
around. (T 1672) The nurses were concerned he would r.' p. . 
harm himself because of the vulnerability due to the nature of 
the surgery. on August 17 at 6:30 p.m. a Posey belt was put on 
-5-
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the plaintiff to restrain him in bed. (Tr., p. 1685). The 
belt is like a vest with straps on it designed to keep a pa-
tient in bed and is also used as a reminder that he should nc,t 
get up. Shortly after the belt had been placed on the plaintiff 
Miss Pool found him wandering in the halls and found him to be 
angry and frustrated at having been restrained. (Tr., p. 1674), 
On August 19 or 20 Dr. Schricker had a conversation with Mr. 
Farrow concerning personal problems. Plaintiff related that~ 
was concerned about his wife with whom he had had marital and 
domestic difficulties over a long period of time. He told the 
doctor he had a young daughter who "he thought the world of" and 
who he was very concerned about. He also stated that his busi· 
ness had not been going well and that he had other financial 
worries. (Tr., p. 1895). 
Dr. Sehr icker stated that by August 2 0 the patient had im-
proved, was quite oriented, and was wondering what had happened 
during the last few days. 
Between the time of the operation and probably August 20 
the plaintiff testified that he suffered from visual hallucina-
tions. He had great fear of what was going on and thought the 
world was corning to an end. (Tr., p. 1357). During this per-
iod he experienced sexual fantasies and was extremely frighten~. 
(Tr., p. 1358). The plaintiff stated that he first saw visual 
hallucinations and later suffered from audio hallucinations. 
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He described these sensations, both audio and visual, to Dr. 
Schricker during his confinement. (Tr., p. 1359). Dr. Schricker, 
however, recalled Plaintiff's complaint about visual hallucina-
tions but did not recall any conversation regarding audio hallu-
cinations. (Tr., pp. 1919-1920). 
On August 20 because of his previous discussion with Plain-
tiff, Dr. Schricker requested Mr. Kent Griffiths, a psychologi-
cal social worker of the hospita~ to visit the plaintiff in order 
to help him with his difficulties. (Tr., pp. 1895-1896, 1922). 
About this time Plaintiff recalls waking up in the hospital bed 
and looking at his chart and finding a span of time for which 
he could not account. (Tr., pp. 1356-1357). 
On this day the social worker made a notation in the pro-
gress notes as follows: 
Had long discussion with patient. Reveals 
extensive history of personal and marital 
difficulties. He expressed the dynamics 
involved in his wife's problems and his own. 
His confusion seems to revolve around the 
lack of any consistent meaning to the sig-
n if ican t relationship in his life. He loves 
his family dearly but is unable to express 
those feelings to them and is often sup-
pressed by his wife when he tries to talk 
to her. This can be seen as an extension 
of her own insecurity and needs. So both 
are struggling to have their needs met and 
neither is listening to the other. Will fol-
low up daily. Signed Kent Griffiths, M.S.W. 
(Ex. D-1, p. 87). 
Plaintiff testified that during this period of time he be-
came afraid of all hospital personuel except for Kent Griffiths. 
-7-
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He said that he would be feeling good and in complete control 
of his emotions and suddenly would go into hallucinations and 
become frightened. (Tr., p. 1360). 
The audio delusions which he heard would be the voices of 
four people who were always making derogatory comments about 
him. He stated that Dr. Schricker's voice was involved in the 
hallucination, the voice of an older man, the voice of an older 
woman, and the voice of a man with a southern accent. They 
were not talking directly to him but about him. He thought at 
times he was in a room where psychiatric patients were observed. 
(Tr., p. 1363). 
He recalled telling Mr. Griffiths about these hallucinatio~s· 
around the 18th or 19th of August. (Tr., p. 1366). The plain-
tiff testified that he spent most of his time with Mr. Griffit~ 
talking about his marital problems. (Tr., p. 1469). 
On August 21 the hospital notes revealed the following: 
Dr. Schricker! Can we consider a psych con-
sult on this pt? Kent Griffiths. 
Immediately following this notation is the word, "Yes!" in the 
handwriting of Dr. Schricker. (Ex. D-1, p. 87). 
On the following day another no ta ti on was made by Mr. Gr if· · 
fiths: 
Discussed problems with wife and pt. There 
definitely are and have been for years pro-
blems in this marriage that need psychiatric 
if not other forms of counseling. There 
seems to have been very little give and take 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and this has affected not only the marriage 
but the children as well. Feelings of je-
lousy, inadequacy, resentment, fear, with-
drawal have been expressed. Will continue. 
Signed Kent Griffiths, M.S.W. (Ex. D-1, p. 
88). 
The plaintiff stated that Mr. Griffiths did not talk to 
both him and his wife at the same time. (Tr., p. 1425). He 
disagreed with part of this statement and said specifically that 
while they had marital problems over a fairly lengthy period of 
time there were also long periods of time when they had no pro-
blems. He asked Mr. Griffiths if he would continue marriage 
counseling after he had been discharged from the hospital. He 
did this to please his wife more than for his own personal needs. 
(Tr., p. 1426). 
August 23--The Day 
Dr. Schricker stated that on August 23 he had a conversa-
tion with the plaintiff concerning the need for psychiatric help. 
The primary purpose for obtaining the psychiatrist was to help 
Mr. Farrow with his marital and family problems. The doctor 
stated that at that time he believed the plaintiff was suffering 
from anxiety but not from depression. The plaintiff never hinted 
nor intimated in any way that he might want to take his own life. 
(Tr., p. 1896). 
Plaintiff testified that on the morning of the 23rd he 
talked with Dr. Schricker and asked that the best psychiatrist 
available in salt Lake City contact him. He stated he wanted 
-9-
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someone that could straighten out the hallucinations and his 
great anxiety. (Tr., p. 1369). At this time he was also con-
cerned that the hospital had lost $3, 000 or $4, 000 which he had 
on his person when he arrived. (Tr., p. 1369). The plaintiff 
stated that Dr. Schricker said he would obtain a psychiatrist 
for him but never said that one was actually corning. (Tr., p. 
1372). 
On the morning of the 23rd Dr. Schricker testified that~ 
called Dr. Moench and asked him for a consul tat ion. Dr. Moench 
asked if the evening would be all right and Dr. Sehr icker replied 
it would. (Tr., p. 1897). He told Dr. Moench that the patient 
was having marital difficulties. He then told the plaintiff 
that Dr. Moench would see him that evening. (Tr., pp. 1897-1898), 
Dr. Moench testified that he asked Dr. Schricker if it was an 
emergency and Dr. Schricker replied it was not. (Tr., p. 1299). 
The plaintiff stated that later on in the day Mr. Griffiths 
visited him in his room and asked him if he would like to go 
into the garden area for a while. The plaintiff remembers walkin: 
down at least two flights of stairs and then taking the elevator 
the rest of the way. (Tr., p. 144 3). Farrow recalled that they 
spent about an hour in the patio area which was his most plea-
sant day at the hospital. (Tr., p. 1444). During the meeting 
they discussed his anticipated Tuesday discharge--this buoyed hi5 
spirits. He then returned with Mr. Griffiths to his room by ~~ 
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ing the elevator up six floors. (Tr., p. 1445-1446). 
When Farrow arrived back in his room it was still daylight. 
During the rest of the evening Farrow stated he would pace up 
and down in the room, sit in a chair for a while, get up, lie 
down, etc. He had been doing this for several nights. (Tr., p. 
144 7). 
He admitted on cross examination that during these times 
he realized he was on the sixth floor and frequently looked out 
over the city. (Tr., p. 1447). He stated that he knew when he 
was having a hallucination but that they were overwhelming and 
that he did not have great control over his actions. (Tr., p. 
1448) . 
Lerona Callahan testified that she was a licensed practical 
nurse and had been working at the L.D.S. Hospital for 12 years. 
(Tr., p. 714). She started work on August 23 at 3:00 p.m .. On 
that day she attended the plaintiff at 4:00 and took his tempera-
ture and vital signs. She asked him how he was and he said he 
was fine. He looked fine and had no complaints. (Tr., p. 1716). 
Around 5:00 she gave the plaintiff his food tray and at 
5:30 she collected it. He again had no complaints at that time. 
She recalls looking in on him around 6:00 when she walked down 
the hall. She did not routinely chart every visit unless some-
thing significant occurred. (Tr., pp. 1717-1718). 
August 23--The Night 
Around 7:00 on the evening of the 23rd the defendant Dr. 
-11-
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Louis Moench arrived at the hospital and reviewed Plaintiff's 
chart. He then conferred with the charge nurse and discuss~ 
Plaintiff's previous behavior including the prior restraint 
using the Posey belt. (Tr., pp. 13 04-1324) . 
Dr. Moench testified that he entered the room of Plaintiff, 
introduced himself, and began to discuss Plaintiff's back-
ground. He reviewed with him his medical history concerning 
the operation and also extensively discussed his private life. 
The plaintiff talked about his marital situation, his financial 
situation, and his confinement in the hospital. He related an 
incident where he pulled a gun on his wife because she was five 
minutes late coming home and told how his wife ultimately got 
the gun from him and stuck it in his ribs. (Tr., pp. 1241-1242; 
1879-1880). 
Defendant stated that during the conference Farrow told 
him that he was hearing voices from the ceiling and the doctor 
then showed him that some of the voices were coming from a pil-
low speaker used for television and inter-hospital paging. The 
plaintiff seemed relieved after learning about this speaker. 
(Tr., p. 1242). 
The plaintiff, according to Dr. Moench, expressed fear 
about being transferred to the psychiatric ward and the doctor 
reassured him that he did not think this would be necessary. 
(Tr., p. 1292). During these conversations the plaintiff never 
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stated that he was in terror or fear nor did the doctor gain 
an impression of this fact from talking with him. The doctor 
stated that the plaintiff's demeanor during the interview was 
initially very restless but that he calmed down towards the end. 
He seemed perfectly cooperative and by the end of the conver-
sation the doctor thought he had a fairly good rapport with 
the plaintiff. Farrow seemed perfectly willing to continue the 
conversation as long as the doctor thought it was necessary. 
(Tr., p. 1306). 
The testimony of Plaintiff concerning this visit was 
generally in accordance with that of Dr. Moench. The plaintiff 
stated that he openly discussed his problems with Dr. Moench 
and willingly answered any of the doctor's questions. The plain-
tiff stated to the doctor that he needed and wanted psychiatric 
help. (Tr., p. 1377-1378). 
The plaintiff stated that when the doctor showed him the 
pillow speaker he told the doctor that he already had discovered 
this device and had asked the nurses to stop playing music on it. 
(Tr., p. 1378). Farrow stated that the defendant reassured him 
that everything would be all right. (Tr. , p. 13 7 9) . 
Plaintiff recalled that Dr. Moench frightened him very much, 
and that after he left the plaintiff felt anxiety-ridden and 
fearful that the doctor was transferring him to a state mental 
institution. (Tr., p. 1379). The plaintiff admitted on cross 
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examination that during the interview with Dr. Moench the plain-
t if f made no mention or hint of any intention to jump out of 
the window. (Tr., pp. 1484-1485). 
Dr. Moench testified that upon leaving the plaintiff's 
room he immediately prepared a consultation report. (Ex. D-1, 
pp. 68-70; Tr., pp. 1245-1246). Although previously repro-
duced in Appellant's brief, (Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-21) the 
importance of this report requires verbatim repetition. The 
report stated the following: 
Pt. is a geologist from Moab who had a re-
cent injury & operation for cerv. disc. Fol-
lowing, he has had marked & rapid swings in 
mood, in contact with reality, has fluctua-
ted between cooperation & compliance & com-
bative, suspicious hostility. 
At present he is very tense, says he hears 
voices of 2 to 4 persons--in hall & ceiling, 
talking about (not to) him, keeping him under 
surveilance, (sic) accusing him of being a 
sex fiend, etc. etc. 
Tells of prolonged marital problems, of lack 
of problem-solving skills (bilateral), of 
periods of tension over finances, & esp. re-
cently when his work pressures are high. Had 
2 counselling (sic) sessions but felt that 
he was cast as the villain, so he didn't con-
tinue. Has enjoyed & appreciated his visits--
Mr. Griffiths. Was esp. appreciative of a 
visit off the ward, where the surveilance 
(sic) doesn't follow. 
Inp: 1. Long term marital maladjust. 
2. Present episode is either a disso-
ciative reaction or a paranoid schizophrenic 
reaction. His tension is very high; his 
anxiety level very high; his distortion of 
reality may lead to acts of poor judgment. 
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Suggest: 
1. a phenothiazine med. in fairly 
large doses promptly (I'll take the liberty 
of ordering) . 
2. Avoid barbiturates, if possible 
3. Repeated reassurance by direct 
nurse contact (nurse entering room, standing 
by bed, while talking) 
4. If aud. hallucinations don't sub-
side promptly, may have to move to 3 North 
for safety. 
5. Continue marital counseling--Mr. 
Griffiths. 
Thanks. 
LG '1oench 
23 Aug. 74 
20:00 hour 
After preparing this report he discussed it with the charge 
nurse and Mrs. Nola Hunt, the nursing supervisor. He told them 
that they should check upon the patient at regular intervals and 
suggested at least once an hour. He also suggested that they 
go talk to the plaintiff, identify themselves, and ask how he 
was and if he needed anything. (Tr., pp. 1273-1274). At that 
time he also wrote an order for his prescription which stated 
the following: Mellaril, 100 mg. Stat, 50 mg. q.i.d. and p.r.n. 
Dalmane 30 mg. h.s., p.r.n. (Tr., p. 1253). It was the respon-
sibility of the hospital to obtain the necessary drugs and to 
administer them according to the order. (Tr., p. 1253). 
The doctor stated that he did not view the plaintiff's con-
dition as a psychiatric emergency and thought that the proce-
dure and medicine prescribed would adequately take care of any 
problem that night. (Tr., pp. 1267-1269). He did not call back 
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to the hospital that night since he presumed that if anything 
occurred contrary to his orders he would be notified. (Tr., 
pp. 1268-1269). Nor did he see any reason to call the atte~-
ing physician Dr. Schricker. (Tr., p. 1255). 
Karen Pool, the registered nurse on duty between 3:00 p.m. 
and 11:00 p.m., testified that she was not aware of any hallu-
cination problems until the night of August 23 when she was in-
formed of this fact by Dr. Moench. He told her that Plaintiff 
was hallucinating with voices and made suggestions that the M~ 
ses watch him closely. He also suggested that the nurses not 
give him barbiturates and ordered Mellaril as a prescription 
drug. (Tr., pp. 1675-1676). Nurse Pool stated that she under-
stood Dr. Moench's comments as a nursing order. (Tr., p. 1676). 
She stated that she then read the report that Dr. Moench 
made and conferred with her staff consisting of an LPN and a 
nurse's aide. She told both of the women the essence of the 
consultation and both of them then read the report themselves. 
It was decided that the plaintiff should be checked at least 
every hour. (Tr., p. 1678). 
The nurses decided to keep his door open so they could look 
in on him as they walked by his room. Nurse Pool placed herself 
in a position to check on him frequently. The medication order 
was sent down to the pharmacy. (Tr., p. 1679). 
The Mellaril was not given until 10:00 even though the or-
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der required that it be given immediately. At 10:00 she entered 
the room of plaintiff and gave him the Mellaril and asked him if 
he wanted something for sleep. He replied no. At 11:00 she 
again asked him if he wanted anything for sleep and he again 
refused. (Tr., p. 1680; 1702). When the witness last saw the 
plaintiff she stated he was calm and unexcited and there was no 
evidence that he was suffering from hallucinations. (Tr., p. 
1710). 
LaRona Callahan, the LPN on duty from 3:00 to 11:00 o'clock, 
testified that after Dr. Moench left the hospital she had a con-
versation with Karen Pool and the nurse's aide concerning the 
patient. She stated she read the consultation report and checked 
on the plaintiff at least every hour to make sure he was comfor-
table. Around 8:00 she talked with him about going home and 
about seeing his little girl. (Tr., p. 1720). At that time he 
seemed calm and rested. (Tr., p. 1721). 
At 9:00 or 9:30 she went in and gave_ him a backrub which is 
known as H.S. care. He also appeared calm and coherent at that 
time. (Tr., p. 1722). 
The next time she saw the plaintiff was around 10:30 or 
11:00. She recalled a conversation with the plaintiff as to 
how beautiful the city was at night and how the lights shone. 
She went off shift at 11:30 and noticed him resting and watching 
TV at that time. (Tr., p. 1723). 
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Nurse Pool stated that upon the changing of the shift at 
11:00 she gave the full report to her replacement Diana Karr~. 
She told Diana the contents of the consultation and told her 
to leave the door open and to make frequent visits. (Tr., p. 
1681) . 
The testimony of Plaintiff during this period of time was 
in marked contrast with that of the nurses. He stated that 
after Dr. Moench left, his feelings of anxiety and fear great~ 
increased. He believed he heard the doctor talking out int~ 
hallway about him and that he would be transferred to a state 
mental institution. Sometime before 9:00 he called his wife 
and told her to call him by 9:30 the next morning because he 
felt that something was going to happen to him. (Tr., pp. 1379-
1381). He thought that people were going to come in at night 
and take him away. 
He stated that during this period of time the audio hallu-
cinations continued. He would get into bed and would lie ther€ 
for a few minutes and then walk back and forth around the rooo. 
He would then get up and pace again. (Tr., p. 1381). Farrow 
stated that he was frightened of the nurses and therefore did 
not confide in them. (Tr., p. 1433). He stated he had no re-
collection of any nurses coming into his room after the doctor 
left nor could he recall taking any medication after 8: 00 · He 
also could not remember a backrub given to him by Nurse Callahan 
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as stated in her testimony. (Tr., pp. 1433-1434). 
The Fall and After 
The plaintiff testified that he became more and more anx-
iety ridden and finally decided he had to get out of the room. 
He attempted to go through his bathroom into an adjoining room. 
However, when he approached the room he heard somebody coughing 
and this frightened him so much that he went back to his own 
room. (Tr., p. 1382). He stated that during this time he lost 
track of where he was and part of the time thought he was back 
in the one-story Moab Hospital. (Tr., p. 1382). 
He related that the decision to jump occurred only a few 
moments before he did it. He said that he had no previous in-
tention of jumping and so therefore could not have told anyone 
of his desire to escape. (Tr., pp. 1483-1485). He at first 
tried to unlock the window but could not do so because it was 
bolted. (Tr . , p • 14 8 5 ) • 
Thinking that he was on the ground and that he could just 
jump out of the window and run, he carefully broke the window 
clean so there would be no jagged edges. (Tr., p. 1383). He 
stated on cross-examination that he jumped through the window 
feet-first as if running a hurdle. (Tr., p. 1454). He stated 
that the process of picking up the chair, smashing the window, 
smashing it again, and smashing it once again, throwing it out 
the window, stepping back two paces, and hurdling through the 
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window took approximately 15 seconds. (Tr . , p. 14 6 3 ) . The 
plaintiff stated on cross examination that even though h 
e too~ 
elaborate pains not to get cut he jumped through the window . 
lr1 
spite of his neck injury because he was afraid that the voices 
would come in when they heard the breaking glass. (Tr., pp, 
1486-1487). 
As soon as he exited the window he stated he immediately 
knew what was happening and said, "Oh my God". He landed falfr 
face-down and then rolled on his back. (Tr., p. 1383). 
The testimony concerning what was said after the plaintiff 
had landed on the roof differed greatly between Plaintiff's 
version and that of Defendants. Joseph Saxton, a security offi-
cer for the L.D.S. Hospital, testified that on the morning of 
August 24 he received a message on his radio to go to the west 
end of the hospital. When he arrived the night supervisor ~N 
him to go up on the roof. He climbed up the lattice and turn~ 
his flashlight on an object. He then saw the plaintiff who ~s 
fully conscious. He asked him what he was doing there and t~ 
plaintiff said he had jumped out of the window. The officer 
asked him why he had jumped and the plaintiff said, "I want~ 
to kill myself". He then asked how he got out of the sealed w~ 
dow and was told that Plaintiff had thrown a chair through and 
broke the window. (Tr., pp. 1779-1780). 
The witness immediately called the operator and told her tc 
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1r· 
:c 
notify the emergency room to send a doctor to the west end of 
the hos pi ta 1 · (Tr., P. 178 0) . After this call another guard 
and the hospital emergency doctor arrived on the roof. (Tr., p. 
1786). The witness then went to the second floor where he 
opened a window so there would be better access to the roof. 
In order to do this, however, it required him to use a screw-
driver, a pair of pliers, a hammer, and a chisel since the win-
dow was bolted in the same manner as the window in the plain-
tiff's room. (Tr., pp. 1786-1787). 
Defendants called Dr. John Thompson, an intern on duty at 
the L.D.S. Emergency Ward on the night of August 24. He stated 
that he was summoned around 2:00 that night by a security guard 
who told him that an individual had jumped from a window and was 
lying on the roof. (Tr., pp. 1649-1650). 
When he arrived there a second security guard was standing 
over the individual with a flashlight. The plaintiff was lying 
on his back and was completely conscious. He examined the 
plaintiff and found his vital signs to be stable. He did not, 
however, find any affirmative response to a neurological exami-
nation. (Tr., pp. 1651-1652). 
He asked him if he had jumped from the window and the plain-
tiff responded affirmatively. He then asked him if he was try-
ing to commit suicide and he again answered affirmatively. (Tr., 
p. 1654). 
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Dr. Louis Schricker, the plaintiff's attending physician, 
related how he was notified at 2:40 in the morning by the nur-
sing supervisor that Plaintiff had jumped out of the hospital 
window. He stated that he immediately got dressed and drove 
to the hospital where he was taken by an intern to a window 
which gave him access to plaintiff. (Tr., p. 1893). At the 
time he arrived the plaintiff was fully conscious, alert, and 
fully oriented. At that point, he said, "Chester, Chester, why 
in the world did you do that?" The plaintiff replied to the 
effect that he could not face going back to Moab and the pro-
blems confronting him. (Tr., p. 1900). 
Shortly thereafter he entered a notation in the "progress 
notes" which reads as follows: 
August 24 - At time I arrived at 0325 pa-
tient was on the roof at second floor level 
over the P.T. Entrance. I went out to him 
and found him covered with blankets, head 
sandbagged, and lying as he had landed. 
Depression in the roof. Patient alert and 
conscious. I asked him why he did such a 
thing and he replied that life was not 
worth fighting for, that he had wanted to 
die for many months and this seemed like a 
good time to do it. (Ex. D-1, p. 89; 
Tr., p. 1904). 
The evidence presented was consistent in showing that Plain-
tiff was fully conscious and alert after his fall. All wit-
nesses previously referred to noted this fact and Plaintiff ne-
ver denied his mental sharpness. The vital signs of Plaintiff 
taken immediately after the incident shov.'ed he was calm, awake, 
and lucid. (Tr., pp. 1905-1908). 
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The plaintiff remembered these conversations quite differ-
ently. The plaintiff denied telling the guard, Mr. Saxton, 
that he had tried to commit suicide. He further denied telling 
Dr. Thompson that he tried to commit suicide. (Tr. , p. 19 3 6) . 
As to the conversation with Dr. Schricker he specifically 
denied telling him that life was not worth fighting for or that 
he wanted to die for many months and that it seemed like a good 
time to do it. All he recalled was being asked why he had 
jumped and replying, "I don't know". (Tr., p. 1937, 1386). 
A jury trial was commenced on August 30, 1977 before the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hansen, Jr .. In addition to those wit-
nesses previously referred to in this Statement of Facts, se-
veral other witnesses were called by both the plaintiff and the 
defendant for the purpose of establishing liability and damages. 
Plaintiff read into the record the deposition of Dr. Sidney 
Walker, a California psychiatrist. (Tr., pp. 1558-1559, 1566). 
In addition, the testimony of Dr. Hardin Branch, the former head 
of the University of Utah Department of Psychiatry, was read to 
the jury. (Tr., p. 1569). At the request of Plaintiff's coun-
sel the testimony of both of these doctors and any objections 
made by opposing counsel were omitted from the record. (R., P· 
519; Tr., p. 1569). The plaintiff also called Dr. Charles Rich 
Smart, the chief of surgery of the L.D.S. Hospital, as a witness. 
(Tr., pp. 1575-1584). Other medical witnesses testified on 
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Plaintiff's behalf but limited themselves solely to the ques-
tion of damages. 
Dr. Lincoln Clark and Dr. Eugene Bliss testified on behalf 
of Defendants as to the issue of liability. (Tr., pp. 1790-1855), 
They testified that Dr. Moench had not violated any medical sta~ 
dard in the treatment of Plaintiff. Since most of the pertinent 
testimony of these medical witnesses will be discussed during t~ 
Argument portion of this brief, further comment is unnecessary 
at this point. 
After the court denied Defendant's Motions for Directed 
Verdict (Tr., pp. 1649, 1946) the questions of liability and 
damages were submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict 
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause 
for action. (R., p. 454). 
Plaintiff has initiated this appeal as to Defendants Salt 
Lake Clinic and Louis G. Moench based upon the jury verdict. Tu 
addition, Plaintiff has appealed froM the granting of summary 
judgments in favor of Health Services Corporation and Louis J. 
Schricker. (R., pp. 508-509). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY AS TO THE DUTY OF DEFENDANT MOENCH 
WHEN VIEWED IN LIGHT OF PLAINTIFF'S THEORY 
OF THE CASE AND THE EVIDEiJCE. 
Appellant in his brief claims that the trial court erred in 
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giving Instruction No. 19 to the jury. This instruction reads 
as follows: 
If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the plaintiff intentionally jumped 
from the window in an attempt to conunit sui-
cide, he is not entitled to recover from de-
fendants, and you must find against him, and 
for the defendants, no cause of action. (R., 
p. 483). 
This instruction was modified by the court from the original in-
struction submitted by Defendants which stated the following: 
If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that when the plaintiff jumped from 
the window he was attempting to conunit sui-
cide, he is not entitled to recover damages 
from the defendants. (R., p. 443). 
It should be noted that the modified instruction uses the 
word "intentionally" whereas the proposed instruction omits this 
word. Obviously, the instruction read to the jury was intended 
to preclude Plaintiff from recovery against the defendants if the 
jury found that the plaintiff intentionally attempted to take his 
own life. 
Plaintiff in his brief now argues that this instruction was 
erroneous. The argument is made that, while Plaintiff may have 
attempted to take his own life, he did so only because of a de-
ranged mind and the act of suicide itself was the "poor judgment" 
referred to in Dr. Moench's report. Plaintiff then cites se-
veral authorities to the effect that a psychiatrist has the duty 
to prevent suicide if it is reasonably foreseeable that it may 
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occur. (Appellant's brief, pp. 45-47). 
A review of the record in this case clearly shows, however 
I 
that Plaintiff's argument is without merit in light of the evi-
dence and the theories introduced by Plaintiff at trial. The 
controversy in this case, as shown by the record, evolved around 
two opposing contentions of the parties: Plaintiff claimed that 
the voices and hallucinations forced him to try to escape out 
the window which he believed at ~he time to be only one story 
high and this attempted escape was the type of "poor judgment" 
Dr. Moench referred to in his consultation report; Defendants, 
on the other hand, claimed that Plaintiff knowingly and inten-
tionally at tempted to commit suicide because of his personal de-
sires not to live. 
There was no evidence at trial nor was there any theory 
propounded that Plaintiff attempted to commit suicide because 
he was not in full control of his senses. Plaintiff consiste~~ 
maintained throughout the trial that he never tried to commit sui· 
cide for any reason. Likewise, the plaintiff never offered any 
instructions to the court counteracting Defendant's theory that 
suicide was intentional. An examination of the record amply 
supports these contentions. 
Appellant himself quotes his testimony concerning his at-
tempt to escape from the voices. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-12). 
· · · room He states that he attempted to escape through an adJ01n1ng 
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but was frightened by people talking and coughing. He stated 
that since he thought he was on the ground floor of the Moab 
Hospital that he could easily escape by jumping through the win-
dow. Finally, he testified that as soon as he began falling 
from the window he im.~ediately knew what had happened, i.e., that 
he was actually on the sixth floor of the L.D.S. Hospital. 
This testimony was again repeated during cross examination 
of the plaintiff. The following dialogue between Mr. Hanson 
(Defendant Salt Lake Clinic's attorney) and the plaintiff occur-
red: 
Q But before you went out of the window, 
you have a clear recollection of the 
events that you told us about, do you 
not? 
A Yes, I was trying to get out of the 
room. 
Q When you went out of the window? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q You said you ran and jumped out, is that 
right? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Ran as much as you can and take two 
steps. 
That's right. In other words, you were 
moving a little faster than you ordin-
arily would have been? 
Yes, sir. 
r think you also told us, as I recall 
your testimony this morning, that you 
put one foot on the window sill? 
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A I said I may have. 
I did. 
I didn't say that 
Q Do you recall whether or not you did? 
A I'm not certain of it. 
Q Yes. You were concerned, it didn't 
occur to you at the time you were con-
cerned about the voices or concerned 
about your safety to go through the 
window and climb down so you wouldn't 
be hurt? 
A I didn't realize I was on the sixth 
floor. I thought that I was on the 
first floor, that I would be able to 
jump out and start running and get away 
from the hospital. My sole purpose 
was to get out of that room. 
Q When you thought you were on the first 
floor, did you have any idea how far 
it would have been from the first floor 
down to the ground level? 
A Maybe four or five feet. 
Q You thought you were on the first floor 
even though that day you had been down 
from the sixth floor down to the patio 
and down to the lower level with Mr. 
Griffiths; is that right? 
A That is correct. But I have also told 
you that I had been hallucinating; I 
would have been hallucinating off and on 
all day long. It was a problem for me. 
And my sole intention was to get out of 
that room, and I thought at that time 
that I was on the ground floor. Also, I 
thought I was confused in this respect, 
that part of the time I thought that I 
was in the hospital at Moab and part of 
the time I thought I was in the hospital 
in Salt Lake City. That's as best as I 
can remember. (Tr., pp. 1436-1437). 
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In sharp contrast to this testimony that the exit from 
the window was caused by a desire to escape the voices is the 
testimony of several witnesses who spoke with Plaintiff after 
the fall. 
Mr. Joseph Saxton was the security guard who first arrived 
at the scene and found Plaintiff lying on his back on the roof. 
Mr. Saxton stated the following in his examination by Mr. Snow: 
Q Did you observe whether or not this 
man who was still on the roof was con-
scious or not? 
A He was conscious, yes sir. He was 
talking. 
Q Did you have a conversation with him? 
A Being surprised, I looked down. I said, 
"What are you doing here?" 
Q Who was present when you said that to 
him? 
A Myself and him. 
Q Was anyone else there on the roof at 
that time? 
A No, no one else was on the roof at that 
time. 
Q All right. Tell the jury what you said 
to him and what he said to you. 
A I said to him basically, as I recollect, 
"What are you doing here?" He said, "I 
jumped out of the window." I said, "Why 
did you jump out of the window?" He said, 
"I wanted to kill myself". (Tr., pp. 
1779-1780). 
Upon being asked by the plaintiff's attorney whether the plain-
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tiff had stated to him that he was trying to get away from 
VOi-
ces the witness replied, "No, sir, I do not recall that." !Ir. 
Garrett then asked, "That could have formed part of that con-
versation, though, couldn't it?" The witness then replied, "~t 
to my recollection, sir. The recollection of the conversation 
is just as I have explained previously." (Tr., p. 1792). 
Dr. John Thompson testified that he was on duty at the e~~ 
gency ward the night of the incident. He stated that he was su> 
maned to the roof by a security guard and that upon arriving ~ 
stated: 
I asked him if he jumped from the window and 
he responded affirmatively. That was a vocal 
response but at this time I do not remember 
the exact words. 
Q Was there any further conversation? 
A Following that I asked him if he was 
trying to commit suicide, and he again 
answered affirmatively. (Tr., p. 1654). 
Finally, Dr. Louis Schricker, the plaintiff's attending phy· 
sician, testified as to his conversation with the plaintiff upon 
arriving approximately one hour after the fall. The doctor 
stated the following: 
"Chester, Chester, why in the world did you 
do that?" And he said that he couldn't face 
going back to Moab, that the problems there--
I can't recall the words exactly, but other 
than the fact that he couldn't go back. (Tr., 
p. 1900). 
Immediately after examining the plaintiff, Dr. Schricker 
-30-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
wrote a "Neurology Resident Note" which stated in pertinent part: 
Patient alert and conscious. I asked him why 
he did such a thing and he replied that life 
was not worth fighting for, he had wanted to 
die for many months and this seemed like a 
good time to do it. (Tr., p. 1904). 
In addition to these direct statements made by Plaintiff 
at the time of his fall there was other evidence indicating emo-
tional problems. Plaintiff confirmed that he had divorced his 
wife in 1966 but that they had gotten back together since that 
time. (Tr., p. 1422). His marital difficulties were still con-
tinuing, however, as evidenced by the notations made by Mr. 
Kent Griffiths, the psychiatric social worker. Mr. Griffiths 
made the following notation on August 20 concerning a consulta-
tion with Plaintiff: 
Had long discussion with patient. Reveals ex-
tensive history of personal and marital diffi-
culties. He expressed the dynamics involved 
in his wife's problems and his own. His con-
fusion seems to revolve around the lack of 
any consistent meaning to the significant re-
lationships in his life. He loves his family 
dearly but is unable to express those feelings 
to them and is often supressed by his wife 
when he tries to talk to her. This can be 
seen as an extension of her own insecurity and 
needs. So both are struggling to have their 
needs met and neither is listening to the 
other. (Tr., p. 1423). 
A second entry dated August 22 also reveals family difficulties. 
This stated: 
Discussed problems with wife of patient. 
There definitely are and have been for years 
problems in this marriage that need psychia-
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tric if not other forms of counseling. There 
seems to have been little give and take and 
this has affected not only the marriage but 
the children as well. Feelings of jealousy, 
inadequacy, resentment, fear, withdrawal have 
been expressed. (Tr., p. 1424). 
Dr. Schricker testified that he had a conversation with the 
plaintiff prior to the incident. He related this conversation 
as follows: 
Mr. Farrow was very concerned about his wife, 
that he had had some marital and domestic 
difficulties over a long period of time and 
was concerned about her and concerned about 
his children. And he had a young daughter 
who at that time was seven years of age, a 
pretty little blond gal, that he thought the 
world of, but there was a lot of worry, con-
cern. Apparently his business had not been 
doing too well, he had financial worries, and 
we talked about these from time to time. (Tr., 
p. 1895). 
As a result of this conversation Mr. Griffiths, the psychia 
tric social worker, was consulted in order to try to help him 
solve these problems. (Tr., p. 1922). Other things bothered 
the doctor concerning the relationship between Mr. Farrow a~~ 
wife. He stated: 
Yes, there were many things going on there 
that were disturbing, that were obvious. One 
of the things that disturbed me, and some of 
the nurses, too, for instance, was that when 
Mrs. Farrow would come, why, instead of feed-
ing Mr. Farrow like most other relatives do, 
why, she would come and have a guest tray, 
but let the nurse feed him. We thought this 
was a little strange. And one of the dis-
cussions that Mr. Farrow and I had centered 
around this. A..nd it was obvious that there 
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was a good deal of stress and strain here 
that he loves his little daughter, I thin~, 
probably more than anyone else in the world 
and was always very happy and pleased when 
she was there. And it would be things of 
this nature that we would discuss. (Tr., p. 
1925). 
It was agreed by all medical witnesses, however, that 
while Plaintiff was obviously bothered by these personal pro-
blems, he showed no outward signs of depression or other symp-
toms generally associated with suicide. (Tr., pp. 1808; 1838; 
1882; 1897). 
On rebuttal the plaintiff adamantly denied any attempt of 
suicide. The following dialogue occurred between Plaintiff and 
his counsel during rebuttal testimony: 
Q Now, in connection with the time that 
you were talking there on that roof, do 
you remember Dr. Thompson talking to you? 
A Vaguely. 
Q And you saw Dr. Thompson here testify? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q In this case. And do you recall what 
your conversation was with him, if any? 
A There was very little conversation with 
him. 
Q Do you remember what was said? 
A It was mostly just about how I felt, and 
he really didn't say a whole lot of any-
thing. 
Q And did he ever say to you, "Did you try 
to commit suicide?" And you replied, 
"Yes."'? 
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A Absolutely he did not. 
Q Now, do you remember Mr. Saxton who 
testified here in this case? 
A The guard? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And do you remember him on the roof 
that night? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Did you have a conversation with him? 
A Very brief. He was busy trying to get 
help. He said practically nothing to 
me. 
Q Did you ever say to him that you had 
tried to commit suicide? 
A Certainly not. 
O And did you try to comrnit suicide? 
A No, sir. 
Q Now, there was a conversation that you 
had with Dr. Schricker when he arrived; 
do you remember that? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q On the roof? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And I will ask you to state whether or 
not this transpired in that conversation: 
"I asked why he did such a thing--" that 
is you "--and he--" that is you "--replied 
that life was not worth fighting for, that 
he had wanted to die for many months, and 
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that this seemed like a good time to 
do it." Did you ever say that? 
A No, sir. 
Q And do you recall that conversation 
on the roof with Dr. Schricker? 
A Not what you just said, but I remember 
our conversation with him. 
Q Could you tell us what you said and 
what he said? 
A Well, he said he asked me first--and 
he was standing up a few feet from me--
and he asked, "Chester, why did you do 
it?" And I said, "I don't know." And 
after he came over and was leaning over 
examining me, he said, "Why did you do 
it?" I said, "I don't know." He asked 
me again, "Why did you do it?" I said, 
"I don't know." And that was about the 
end of the conversation. (Tr., pp. 
1936-1937) (Emphasis added). 
In closing argument, Plaintiff's counsel adamantly denied 
any attempt of suicide regardless of what the motivating cause 
may have been. Mr. Garrett stated to the jury: 
This was not an attempted suicide, ladies and 
gentlemen. This man had nothing to be de-
pressed about. His business was going good. 
Sure, he had trouble with his wife. There is 
no question about that. You don't kill your-
self over that; you get a divorce. That's 
the modern way. And that's all it was here. 
He had a little daughter that he loved. And 
he wouldn't want to take his life. You heard 
that from Dr. Schricker. That little daughter 
means everything to him. You don't kill your-
self when you are raising babies. He was re-
sponding to those voices, trying to get away 
from them, and that's all he was doing at the 
time. And that's what Dr. Branch says. (Tr., 
p. 1968). 
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After Defendant's counsel made their closing st t a ement to 
the jury observing that suicide was a very likely possibility 
in light of the testimony and evidence introduced at the trial 
Mr. Roberts, in rebuttal, then made the following statenent: 
The testimony of Mr. Farrow, I think, rings 
true. He was having these auditory hallu-
cinations. He was scared. He wanted to get 
away from these voices. And that's why he 
went out the window. He had no reason. What 
reason did he have to kill himself? lie was 
having marital difficulties, yes. Said he 
was having no financial difficulties, he was 
doing better than he had done for a year at 
that time. Why would he want to take his 
life? 
He had a daughter that he loved, people that 
he wanted to live for, had been talking about 
getting out on the next Tuesday. He had 
things to live for. That isn't the frame 
of mind of a person who is going to commit 
suicide. 
And then I think one thing of great signifi-
cance is one of these notes on the progress 
reports on August 30--this is after the event--
and Mr. Griffiths, his friend who has been 
talking to over this period of time, put the 
note in the progress report, and he says this: 
"Nice discussion with patient. He was very 
coherent and self-expressive. We discussed 
the precipitance of his accident. He felt 
that the voices and noises were unbearable at 
that moment and that they were even out in the 
hall, so the window seemed the only escape 
route. 
And then the other thing that would indicate 
that this is not a suicide: Can you imagine 
somebody who is going to commit suicide check-
ing around and taking all of the glass off so 
he won't get cut? Isn't that the action of a 
man who wants to get out of there and get 
away? He said, I hurdled that. He said, I 
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thought I was in Moab. I thought I was on 
the first floor. 
So we submit that on this question of sui-
cide that he did not intend to commit suicide. 
Nobody in this record said that he indicated 
he was going to do it. And he had been under 
close observation. Dr. Moench didn't see it. 
He just didn't commit suicide. He was trying 
to escape from those voices that were giving 
him the problem. (Tr., pp. 2001-2002). (Em-
phasis added) . 
Thus, the preceding evidence shows quite clearly that the 
plaintiff's version of the fall greatly differed from that of 
Defendants', i.e. Plaintiff claiming escape and Defendants claim-
ing suicide. The record is void of any argument made by Plain-
tiff during the trial to the effect that while he was admit-
tedly trying to commit suicide he was doing it because of his 
mental condition at the time of the jump. As has been seen, 
Plaintiff adamantly denied attempting suicide for any reason 
and steadfastly claimed that the "voices" forced him to flee the 
window. 
For Appellant to now claim that the jury instruction was 
prejudicial because it denied him the opportunity to argue that 
even an act of suicide may have been "poor judgment" is an after-
thought which cannot be sustained by this 2ourt. 
It was Appellant's obligation to propose instructions which 
presented his theory of the facts. For example, if Plaintiff 
believed he had irrationally attempted suicide because of the 
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negligence of Defendants in not restraining him, he should ha\'c 
formulated an instruction to that effect and presented it to 
the trial court for consideration. In fact, no such instruc-
tion was offered by Plaintiff. (R., pp. 455-461). 
It was not the duty of Defendants to propose an instruc-
tion which would cover Plaintiff's theory of the incident. 
This Court in Ferguson v. Jongsma, 350 P.2d 404 (Utah 1960) 
clearly stated this rule in the reverse context of plaintiff 
and defendant. This Court stated: 
Plaintiff in proposing an instruction on his 
theory of the case is not required to also 
propose instructions setting out all the pos-
sible defenses thereto. If defendants desired 
instructions on defenses to any ground which 
would allow plaintiff to recover they should 
propose them. Id. at 410. 
Furthermore, even had such an instruction been proposed, 
the evidence simply did not support such a theory. There was 
no testimony that Plaintiff attempted suicide because of the~' 
ces or because of an irrational mind. He consistently denied 
any suicide from any cause. 
This Court in Black v. McKnight, 562 P. 2d 621 (Utah 197il 
stated that the trial court may properly refuse to give a re-
quested instruction where it does not accurately reflect the la'• 
governing the factual situation of the case. 
Similarly, in an earlier case, this Court in Griffin v. 
133 P 2d 333 (U tah 19~ 1 Prudential Insurance Company of America, · 
-38-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stated that it was error to give instructions on a state of 
facts where there is no evidence even should such instruction 
contain correct statements of law. See also Ferguson v. Jongs-
ma, 350 P.2d (Utah 1960). 
Defendants do not dispute the rules of law cited by Ap-
pellant in his brief concerning the duty of a psychiatrist to 
prevent a patient from harming himself if such harm is fore-
seeable. (Appellant's brief, pp. 46-47). However, there is 
no evidence that Plaintiff gave any sign that he was contemplat-
ing suicide nor is there any evidence by Plaintiff's own testi-
mony that he attempted suicide. The question of suicide, there-
fore, was totally a defense to Plaintiff's claims that he was 
driven out of the window by the voices and that Defendants ne-
gligently allowed this attempted escape to occur. 
Instruction No. 20 concerning proximate cause is a correct 
statement of the requirement of duty, proximate cause, and dam-
ages and does not in any way distort the previous jury instruc-
tion. Plaintiff's claimed error with this instruction (Appel-
lant's brief, p. 48) requires an extremely strained speculation 
of the jurors' thinking and is totally unrealistic in view of 
the correctness of the instruction standing by itself. 
In addition to the preceding reasons for rejecting Appel-
lant's claimed error, there exists one further ground against 
Appellant, i.e., the objections to Instructions 19 and 20 were 
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not made timely. The parties stipulated that objections to 
the jury instructions could be made after the jury retired. 
(Tr., p. 1948). The jury began its deliberations at 1:00 p.rn. 
and Defendants presented their objections to the instructions 
at that time. (Tr., pp. 2010-2023). At 3:30 p.rn. the jury 
returned with its verdict. (Tr., p. 2024). Plaintiff's ex-
ceptions were given after the rendering of the verdict and 
after the jury's discharge. (Tr., pp. 2025-2027). 
This Court has repeatedly held that Rule 51, U.R.C.P. 
requires timely objections be made to jury instructions in or-
der to allow the trial court an opportunity to cure any error. 
Johnson v. Simons, 551 P.2d 515 (Utah 1976); Black v. McKnight, 
562 P.2d 621 (Utah 1977); Hanson v. General Builders Supply Co., 
389 P.2d 61 (Utah 1964). Certainly, objections made after the 
jury has been discharged cannot be considered timely. 
For these reasons, the trial court was correct in submit-
ting Instructions 19 and 20 to the jury. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR AS TO 
THE TESTIMONY OF DP.. SIDNEY WALKER OR AS 
TO THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 11. 
A. Dr. Walker's Testimony. 
1. The Plaintiff has Waived Any ClaiQed Error Re-
garding Dr. Walker's Testimony by Omitting it From the Trans-
cript Record. 
Appellant in his brief recites that Dr. Sidney Walker, a 
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specialist in neuro-psychiatry, examined Plaintiff's records 
and reviewed various depositions before testifying at his own 
deposition taken on July 27, 1976. Plaintiff then asserts that 
even though Dr. Walker in his deposition testified that the 
various defendants failed to properly care for the plaintiff, 
the trial judge incorrectly refused to allow this opinion to be 
admitted into evidence. The reason for this omission, accord-
ing to the plaintiff, is that the doctor had never practiced 
medicine in Utah and therefore was incompetent to testify as to 
the medical standard of care in this state. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 49-50). 
There is nothing in the transcript of the trial evidencing 
Plaintiff's contentions and, the fact is, many portions of Dr. 
Walker's deposition were read to the jury and were not omitted 
by the trial court. 
The transcript offers no assistance to this Court as to 
what specific portions of Dr. Walker's testimony was omitted by 
the trial court. The transcript states on page 1558, "The tes-
timony of Dr. Sidney Walker was read into the record. During a 
reading of the deposition counsel argued their respective posi-
tions". A reference is then nade on page 1559 that an objection 
to the deposition starting on page 26 was overruled by the trial 
court. It is then noted that the deposition was continued to be 
read until 2:00 that afternoon. (Tr., p. 1559). Finally, the 
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record notes that counsel concluded the reading of Dr. Walker', 
deposition. (Tr. , p. 15 5 6) . 
The "Designation of Record on Appeal" filed by Plaintiff 
specifically excluded the testimony of Dr. Walker. (R.' p. 
519). All depositions in the court file were designated and 
this request necessarily included the deposition of Dr. Walk~. 
( R. , pp. 6 77 - 814 ) . However, how this deposition was used at 
trial and the specific objections made by Defendants' counsel 
is absent from the record. 
The failure of Plaintiff to include the actual reading of 
the deposition and the rulings of the trial court precludes 
Plaintiff from now claiming error as to alleged omissions of 
testimony. Several courts in other jurisdictions have dealt 
with similar problems. 
In Grover v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Compan;, 
207 S.E.2d 584 (Ct. App. Ga. 1974) the following statement ~s 
made: 
Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred in 
excluding from the evidence portions of Dr. 
Lawrence Lee Freeman's depositional testi-
mony. A reading of the trial transcript 
beginning at page 117 indicates that the de-
position was not introduced as such but was 
read before the jury. At those portions 
which Appellant contends were erroneously 
excluded the transcript shows that objec-
tions were made by defense counsel. Instead 
of reading those portions into the trial re-
cord and obtaining a ruling by the judge 
thereon, the portions were omitted. Thus 
we are unable to pass upon the assertion. 
Our "decision must be made on the record 
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sent to this court by the clerk of the court 
below and not upon the briefs of counsel". 
Jenkins v. Board of Zoning, Etc., 122 Ga. 
App. 412, 413, 177 S.E.2d 204, 206. Id. at 
586. 
Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals in Williamson v. 
Epperson, 529 S.W.2d 25 (Ct. App. Mo. 1975) made the following 
pertinent observations: 
Further and more important, the plaintiffs 
have come to this court on a record wholly 
insufficient for us to adjudicate the merits 
of their claim. They argue specifically 
they were denied the opportunity to read 
certain questions and answers from a depo-
sition, but the deposition is not preserved 
in the record, except for those parts which 
were actually offered and received. Since 
the deposition was not copied into the record, 
then made a part of the record here in any 
manner, we cannot pass on the admissibility 
of the parts of the deposition plaintiffs 
sought to offer. Id. at 29. (Emphasis added). 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Sun Cab Company v. 
Walston, 289 A.2d 804 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) stated the fol-
lowing: 
Appellants proffered to read into evidence 
some 13 lines from a pre-trial deposition 
of Richard B. Walston. The court, "after 
hearing discussion from counsel and reading 
the case offered" denied that request. The 
record does not contain the discussion, nor 
the deposition. We have no way of knowing 
what was proffered, nor the reasons advanced 
for and against its admission. There is 
nothing we can rule upon. Id. at 822. (Em-
phasis added). 
~also Paulin v. Paulin, 102 P.2d 809 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940); 
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Friesen v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, 524 p 
2 
. 
• d 
1141 (Kan. 1974). 
The obvious principle behind these decisions is that a 
re· 
viewing court cannot tell whether prejudice has occurred by th! 
omission of testimony unless the specific testimony omitted ~ 
the objections made are before the reviewing court. In this 
case the entire deposition of Dr. Walker was before the court 
and only portions of the testimony were objected to by Defen-
dants. It is impossible to tell from the present record what 
that testimony was and whether it constituted an "opinion" of 
Dr. Walker or consisted of other material. In addition, it is 
impossible to know what the grounds for the exclusion was and 
if, indeed, all exclusions related solely to the medical stan-
dard of care in Utah. 
For this reason alone, Plaintiff's contention that the 
court erred in omitting portions of Dr. Walker's testimony ca~ 
not be substantiated by this Court and must therefore be rej~· 
ted. 
2. In Any Event, the Testimony of Dr. Walker Was 
Cumulative and Inferior to That of Plaintiff's Other Expert, Dr 
Branch and Any Omission Was Therefore Harmless. 
It is important to note that this is not a case where 
Plaintiff was denied expert witness testimony for failure to 
meet a standard. First, as previously noted, a large portion 
of Dr. Walker's testimony was read to the jury. Second, and mer 
-44-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
importantly, the testimony of Dr. Hardin Branch was read to the 
jury jn its entirety with no omissions or deletions. (Tr., p. 
1569). The testimony of Dr. Branch in and of itself was suffi-
cient to establish Plaintiff's theory of a standard and created 
a jury question. 
The deposition of Dr. Branch was taken on two separate oc-
casions: first on August 4, 1977 (R., pp. 853-927); and again 
on September 3, 1977 (R., pp. 1095-1155). 
There is no doubt that Dr. Branch was eminently qualified 
to testify both in his expertise as a psychiatrist and as to 
his experience in Utah. He obtained his M.D. degree in 1935 
and subsequently worked in Pennsylvania. From 1948 until 1970 
he was Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at the University 
of Utah Medical Center. (R., pp. 861-862). The doctor was fa-
miliar with Utah health care facilities (R., pp. 863-864), super-
vised residents who trained in the various hospitals including 
the L.D.S. Hospital (R., p. 916), and attended various conven-
tions and conferences in Utah since 1970. (R., p. 917). Dr. 
Branch was the supervisor at various times of Dr. Eugene Bliss 
and Dr. Lincoln Clark who testified on behalf of the Defendants. 
In fact, Dr. Moench himself was also a member of the department 
which Dr. Branch headed. (R., p. 889). 
Defendants' expert witness, Dr. Lincoln Clark, stated that 
Dr. Branch had hired him at the time he joined the University of 
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Utah faculty and that he considered Dr. Branch to be a na-
tionally-recognized competent psychiatrist. (Tr·, pp. 1815-
1816). Dr. Eugene Bliss, Defendants' second expert witness, 
also acknowledged Dr. Branch as a very competent psychiatrist 
who had international recognition. (Tr., p. 1844). 
In fact, the only question as to the competency of any 
expert witness was made by Dr. Branch concerning the qualifi-
cations of Dr. Walker--Plaintiff's expert witness whose testi· 
mony is claimed to have been so critical. Dr. Branch stated 
that there is no such thing as a "neuro-psychiatrist" since a~ 
tors are either certified in psychiatry or in neurology. (R., 
pp. 8 81- 8 8 2) • 
Dr. Branch was qualified as an expert witness under eit~ 
the "local community" standard or any other standard and the 
trial court allowed his testimony to be read to the jury. Wit'..· 
out elaborating as to the essence of Dr. Branch's testimony it 
suffices to say that it was sufficient to challenge the actiom 
of Defendants as to the proper psychiatric standard. Dr. Bnoc 
testimony is well summarized in the argument of counsel during 
Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict. (Tr., pp. 1624-1643; 
see e.g. Tr., pp. 1624-1626; 1641-1643). 
The reliance upon Dr. Branch as establishing a standard i: 
further shown in the closing argument to the jury by Mr. Gar-
rett: 
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Now, let me try and put a little more on 
that. First of all, Dr. Rranch testified 
in this case for the plaintiff, and he tes-
tified concerning the standard of care--in 
other words, what must you do if you are to 
avoid being at fault with a patient? That 
is what, in effect, he is saying. And he 
had an opinion to render, and I bring it to 
you for your assistance at arriving at a 
verdict in this case. 
This was a question by Mr. Roberts: And 
doctor do you have an opinion as to whether 
or not Dr. Moench used the care and diligence 
ordinarily exercised by psychiatrists in the 
vicinity of Salt Lake City in caring for this 
patient to whom he had been called in for a 
psychiatric consultation? Do you have such 
an opinion? 
Answer: Yes, sir, I do. 
Question: And what is that opinion? 
Answer: I think that ordinary care would 
have required the placing of this patient 
in a more protected situation either in his 
own room or in a psychiatric unit. 
* * * 
There are other things in his testimony, as 
you will recall. He amplified on that. He 
said he didn't sufficiently impress the nur-
ses with the urgency of the situation. (Tr., 
pp. 1956-1957). (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the testimony of Dr. Branch sufficiently presented 
Plaintiff's theory of the standard which Defendants allegedly 
failed to maintain. Dr. Branch was eminently more qualified 
to testify than was Dr. Walker. It is therefore difficult to 
believe that Dr. Walker's testimony would have had any effect 
upon the 1ury's consideration. 
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As stated by the Supreme Court of Kansas, "Error 
may not 
be predicated upon the exclusion of evidence which is merely 
cumulative and does not add materially to the weight 1 or c arit 
of that already received." Friesen v. Chicago, Rock Island~ 
Pacific Railroad, 524 P.2d 1141, 1149 (Kan. 1974). See also 
---
Watkins v. Utah Poultry and Farmer's Cooperative, 251 P.2d 6E; 
(Utah 1952). 
In summary, the Plaintiff has waived any claim of error 
committed as to the exclusion of Dr. Walker's testimony. But 
even if such an error were not waived, Plaintiff has made no 
showing that the alleged omitted testimony would have had any 
substantial effect upon the outcome of this case in light of 
the testimony of Dr. Branch--a man acknowledged by Defendants' 
own medical witnesses to be an internationally recognized ex~ 
in psychiatry. 
B. Instruction No. 11. 
1. Plaintiff Himself Proffered Two Instructions C1 
taining the "Local Community" Standard and Cannot Now Claim 
Error. 
Appellant complains that the eleventh instruction the 
court read to the jury, speaking in terms of "accepted stan-
dards of psychiatric care in this community", was erroneous 
because it applied the "locality rule". (Appellant's brief, 
50). Appellant then proceeds to attack the existence of the 
locality rule and argues that a more liberal standard should 
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be adopted. (Appellant's brief, pp. 51-58). Of course, this 
court has in fact adopted the more liberal "similar community" 
standard argued by Appellant in its recent decision of Swan v. 
~· Case No. 14823. Admittedly, Instruction No. 11 utilized 
the existing standard of the "local community". (R., p. 475). 
Unlike the plaintiff in the Swan case, however, Appellant 
proffered instructions to the court containing the local stan-
dard. One proposed instruction of Plaintiff stated: 
You are instructed that if you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Defen-
dant Louis G. Moench, in treating Plaintiff, 
failed to exercise the care and diligence 
ordinarily exercised by a psychiatrist in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, then you are instructed 
that the said Louis G. Moench was negligent. 
(R., p. 457). (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff's second instruction stated: 
And if you find further from a preponderance 
of the evidence that such conduct in one or 
more of the foregoing ways constituted a fail-
ure on the part of the said defendant to 
exercise the care and diligence ordinarily 
exercised by psychiatrists in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, then you are instructed that said Louis 
G. Moench was negligent. (R., p. 458). (Em-
phasis added). 
Both of these instructions were given by the trial court as 
Nos. 12 and 13. (R., pp. 476-477). 
Thus, it is difficult to imagine how Plaintiff can complain 
about the giving of Instruction No. 11 when it is basically no 
different than Instructions Nos. 12 and 13 which were proposed 
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by Plaintiff and adopted by the trial court. Plaintiff has 
thus waived any claim of an erroneous standard being given by 
the fact that he compounded the error. 
2. The Similar Community Standard Was In Fact Given 
by the Trial Court in Instruction No. 10. 
Defendant Moench proffered an Instruction No. 5 which in-
eluded the similar community standard. (R., p. 405). Plaintiff 
proffered a similar instruction including this standard. (R,, 
p. 456). 
The court combined both of these proffered instructions 
and gave them as Instruction No. 10. It stated the following: 
In performing professional services for a 
patient, a physician or surgeon has the duty 
to have that degree of learning and skill 
ordinarily possessed by physicians and sur-
geons of good standing, practicing in the same 
or a similar locality and under similar cir-
cumstances. 
It is his further duty to use the care and 
skill ordinarily exercised in like cases by 
reputable members of his profession practic-
ing in the same or a similar locality under 
similar circumstances, anu to use reasonable 
diligence and his best judgment in the exer-
cise of his skill and the application of his 
learning, in an effort to accomplish the pur-
pose for which he is employed. 
In determining whether Dr. Moench properly 
fulfilled the duties imposed upon him as a 
psychiatrist, you are not permitted to set up 
a standard of your own, but must look to the 
testimony and evidence presented by physicians 
at the trial as to what the standard of care 
was at the time in question. (R., p. 474) · 
(Emphasis added). 
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Thus, Instruction No. 10 was extremely specific as to the 
standard of care and actually utilized the "similar community" 
standard even though it was not required by Utah law at that 
time. For purposes of determining propriety of jury instruc-
tions the instructions should all be considered together. Whyte 
v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 1289, (Utah 1976). 
The Tenth jury instruction specifically spoke in terms of 
the medical standard to be applied and utilized the "similar 
community standard". The Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth in-
structions only incidentally ref erred to a standard and any 
erroneous standard was included in two instructions offered by 
Plaintiff himself. 
For this reason, any misstatement of the standard in the 
Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth instructions was harmless even 
if it were assumed that the similar community standard was appli-
cable prior to the Swan decision. 
Finally, as discussed supra Plaintiff failed to make a 
timely objection as to Instruction No. 11 and has therefore 
waived any claimed error. Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621 (Utah 
1977). 
C. The Local Community Standard was a Correct Statement 
of the Law in Utah at the Time of the Incident and at the Time 
of Trial and any Change in such Standard Should Not be Applied 
Retroactively to Incidents or Trials Predating the Swan Decision. 
It is manifestly unjust to apply the new "similar locality 
standard" to the defendants in this case and to any other par-
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ties retroactively because this Court's decision in Swan has 
changed a standard of care upon which these defendants, defen-
dan ts in other pending lawsuits, and doctors not yet sued, have 
been entitled to rely upon. 
Justice Hall and Justice Henriod in the Swan decision dis-
sented on the grounds that the decision should be applied pros-
pectively only. This position is correct in light of the se-
vere prejudice a retroactive change in a standard can create. 
Dr. Moench and the other defendants in this case acted in 
accordance with the local community standard in the treatment 
of Plaintiff. It is manifestly unjust to now, two years later, 
require different standards of care than that which all parties 
relied upon at the time of the incident and the time of the 
trial. 
This Court on numerous occasions has refused to apply a 
change in statutory or common law retroactively when substantial 
rights were being affected. Rubalcava v. Gissman, 384 P.2d 389 
(Utah 1963); Williams v. Utah State Department of Finance, 464 
P.2d 596 (Utah 1970); Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d 521 
(Utah 1976); and Stanton v. Stanton, 564 P.2d 303 (Utah 1977). 
This Court's decision of State v. Kelbach, 565 P.2d 700 
(1977) stated in great detail the purpose of applying overrul~ 
decisions prospectively: 
As a general proposition the law as established 
should remain so until changed by the legisla-
-52-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ture, whose prerogative it is to make and 
change the law. This does not mean to say 
that where there is judge-made law which is 
later observed to be clearly in error, that 
such error should be so set in cement that 
it cannot be remedied. In such circumstances 
the court undoubtedly can and should correct 
it. 
But more important than any of the above is 
the oft proclaimed salutary principle: That 
ours is a government of laws and not of men. 
Accordingly, the law should not be changed 
simply because of the will or desire or jud-
ges as to what the law is or ought to be. 
Much less so, should it be so changed during 
the course of a particular proceeding to have 
a retroactive effect thereon. Notwithstand-
ing the fact that the change the state advo-
cates would vindicate the position taken in 
the dissent referred to, to so hold in this 
case retroactively would violate what we re-
gard as a higher principle: that of honoring 
the established law. If there is to be such 
a change in the law, whether by legislative 
act or by judicial decision, it seems that it 
should have only prospective effect and that 
fairness and good conscience requires that it 
should not be applied retroactively to ad-
versely affect rights as they existed at the 
time the particular controversy arose. Id. 
at 702. (Emphasis added). 
This long line of cases clearly shows this Court's concern 
that the law be a reliable monument upon which a party can rely--
not a shifting mound of sand. The change to the "similar lo-
cality rule" is a drastic one that overrules a standard which 
has existed for over 100 years. It is unjust to apply this new 
standard with all of its consequences and ramifications to these 
defendants and to other physicians who in good faith attempted 
to meet the local community standard existing at the time the 
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alleged malpractice occurred. 
Such unfairness affects the defendants in the instant 
all the physicians presently in litigation and all f t 
, u ure ph~,_ 
sicians or professionals whose actions occurred prior to the 
Court's decision in Swan. 
For these reasons, even if it is assumed for the sake of 
argument that Dr. Walker's testimony was wrongfully excluded 
or that Instruction No. 11 was wrongfully given, this Court 
should hold that the similar community standard is not applica· 
ble to cases predating the Swan decision. 
POINT III 
DR. MOENCH AND THE SALT LAKE CLINIC HAVE 
BEEN VINDICATED BY A JURY AND THIS COURT'S 
DECISION AS TO THE OTHER DEFENDANTS SHOULD 
NOW HAVE NO EFFECT UPON THEM. 
Appellant argues in his brief that all of the defendants 
should be tried jointly in order to avoid prejudice to the Pl~ 
tiff since a litigating defendant has the opportunity of "poi~ 
ing the finger" to a missing defendant. While this may or may 
not be true, there is no rule of law which requires all def en-
dants to be tried concurrently and in fact Rule 20(b) and Ru~ 
42 (b) specifically allow a trial court discretion in separatinc 
the trial of parties or issues. 
Dr. Moench and the Salt Lake Clinic have undergone an ex-
haustive trial and have been vindicated by a jury. The fact 
that Dr. Schricker and the L.D.S. Hospital did not participate 
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in this trial is irrelevant to these defendants. If this Court 
determines that the sununary judgment as to those defendants was 
improperly granted then a new trial should be ordered as to 
those defendants but Dr. Moench and the Salt Lake Clinic are 
certainly not required to undergo a second trial for the advan-
tage of the plaintiff and his claim of prejudice by their ab-
sence. 
If, indeed, the jury concluded that the hospital was the 
negligent party in failing to correctly administer the orders 
of Dr. Moench, then it is probable that a new jury would reach 
this same conclusion when the hospital itself was being tried. 
Notwithstanding Plaintiff's argument, even if the hospital 
points the accusing finger to Dr. Moench, it must be presumed 
that the new jury will determine which party, if anY, was negli-
gent in the treatment of Plaintiff and bring back a verdict 
against that defendant if he or it is a party to the trial. 
Even the plaintiff himself in his brief indicates that had 
the medication ordered by Dr. Moench been given at the correct 
time and in the correct dosage, "this tragedy could have been 
prevented". (Appellant's brief, pp. 27, 33). And Plaintiff also 
notes that had Dr. Schricker responded promptly "as he should 
have, this tragedy would have been avoided". (Appellant's brief, 
p. 37). 
Obviously, if both Dr. Schricker and the L.D.S. Hospital 
-55-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
caused the injury to Plaintiff, the correct verdict was rendo 
~r: 
favorably for both Dr. Moench and the Salt Lake Clinic ancl t' fie 
should not be subjected to a second trial regardless of the o": 
come concerning the other defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
A brief review of the Statement of Facts reveals that at 
the time Plaintiff was admitted to the L.D.S. Hospital he was 
encountering severe personal problems. Dr. Moench quickly a~ 
professionally responded to Dr. Sehr icker' s request for ass is-
tance and professionally evaluated and prescribed treatment fm 
Plaintiff. The evidence is clear that Plaintiff exhibited no 
signs of self-destruction. There was no way, therefore, that 
Dr. Moench could have predicted the action which Plaintiff took 
on the night of August 24. 
Plaintiff claimed that he heard voices which compelled hfo 
to escape from his room. Defendants claimed, on the other ha~, 
that for personal reasons--and perhaps based upon reckless i~-
pulse alone--Plaintiff attempted to kill himself. These were 
the only two theories propounded at trial and argued by the re· 
spective parties. 
Instruction 19 concerning suicide was properly given by 
the trial court in that it presented Defendants' theory of the 
incident. Had Plaintiff wanted to contend that he was actual~ 
attempting to commit suicide but that his action was cornrclled 
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by his delusions and hallucinations, he should have introduced 
evidence in support of this theory and tendered an instruction. 
In reality, however, there was neither evidence of this 
theory now argued in Appellant's brief nor was an instruction 
offered presenting it. In addition, Plaintiff did not make 
timely objection to the instructions and has therefore waived 
any claimed error. For these reasons, the trial court was cor-
rect in giving Instruction No. 19 and No. 20 to the jury. 
The plaintiff fails to present an adequate record to this 
Court for review of Dr. Walker's testimony. This failure con-
stituted a waiver of any such claim. In addition, any testi-
mony offered by Dr. Walker was cumulative to the superior tes-
timony of Dr. Branch who was eminently more qualified as an ex-
pert in psychiatry and whose opinion as to Defendants' breach 
of standard was received into evidence. 
Instruction Eleven was not prejudicial because Instruction 
Ten actually presented the "similar community" standard and in 
light of the fact that Plaintiff himself offered two instructions 
adopting the local community standard about which he now com-
plains. 
The decision by this Court in Swan should only be applied 
prospectively from the date of the decision so that doctors and 
other professional people are not held accountable to a standard 
Wltich did not exist at the time the alleged malpractice occurred. 
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Finally, the outcome as to the other defendants in this 
appeal is irrelevant to these defendants since they have al-
ready been tried and vindicated by a jury. 
For all of these reasons, therefore, the jury verdict shoui 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
(' 
, ' .' .1. ·rw, .,..._., 
I v. ~ /, 
7th Floor, Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent Salt 
Lake Clinic 
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I • 
,Oohn H. Snow 
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/'· 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
7th ~loor, Continental Bank 
Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent Dr. 
Louis G. Moench 
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